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  1  F  Nietzsche ,  ‘ Twilight of the Idols: Or, How One Philosophizes with a Hammer ’ in  The Portable 
Nietzsche ,  ed and tr Walter Kaufmann ( fi rst pub 1888 ,  Viking  1954 ) 463, 479 – 80 (III,  § 1). Inciden-
tally, one of Nietzsche ’ s illustrations of how concepts  ‘ become ’ rather than  ‘ are ’ dealt with a legal 
example: punishment. See  F  Nietzsche ,  On the Genealogy of  Morals , tr  D  Smith ( fi rst pub 1887 , 
 Oxford University Press  1996 )  44 – 53 . 
  2  B  Williams ,  ‘ Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline ’ ( 2000 )  75  Philosophy  477, 486 . 
  3  T  Sorell ,  ‘ Introduction ’ in  T  Sorell and  GAJ  Rogers (eds),  Analytic Philosophy and History of  
Philosophy ( Oxford University Press  2005 ) 1, 1. Both Williams and Sorell challenged this view. For 
a moderate endorsement of this ahistoricist conception of philosophy, see  T  Williamson ,  Doing 
Philosophy:  From Common Curiosity and Logical Reasoning ( Oxford University Press  2019 )  105 . 
Interestingly, Williamson calls this philosophical practice  ‘ Oxford-style ’ (ibid 100). This approach 
fi ts nicely within what I consider elsewhere the dominant approach to philosophy at Oxford, which 
has had much infl uence on legal philosophy in the English speaking world. See  D  Priel ,  ‘ Evidence-
Based Jurisprudence: An Essay for Oxford ’ [ 2019 ]  2  Analisi e Diritto  87 . 
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 Analytic Jurisprudence in Time 
 DAN  PRIEL 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 Friedrich Nietzsche had this to say about philosophers: 
 You ask me which of the philosophers ’ traits are really idiosyncrasies ? For example, 
their lack of historical sense, their hatred of the very idea of becoming, their 
Egypticism. They think that they show their  respect for a subject when they 
de-historicize it,  sub specie aeterni  – when they turn it into a mummy. All that 
philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been concept-mummies; 
nothing real escaped their grasp alive. When these honorable idolators of concepts 
worship something, they kill it and stuff it; they threaten the life of everything they 
worship. Death, change, old age, as well as procreation and growth, and to their 
minds objections  – even refutations. Whatever has being does not become; whatever 
becomes does not have being. 1 
 Rather than take offence, many philosophers these days will consider Nietzsche ’ s 
words a compliment. Bernard Williams reported on a fellow philosopher who 
had told him that  ‘ the history of philosophy is no more part of philosophy than 
the history of science is part of science ’ . 2 In a similar vein, Tom Sorell observed 
that  ‘ the techniques and predilections of analytic philosophy are not only unhis-
torical but anti-historical ’ . 3 The majority of Anglophone legal philosophers 
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  4  HLA  Hart ,  ‘ Introduction ’ in  J  Austin ,  The Province of  Jurisprudence Determined , ed HLA Hart 
( fi rst pub 1832 ,  Weidenfeld  & Nicolson  1954 ) vii, xv. 
  5  A  Marmor ,  Philosophy of  Law ( Princeton University Press  2011 )  118 . 
  6  A view defended, among others, in  J  Raz ,  The Authority of  Law:  Essays on Law and Morality 
( 2nd edn ,  Oxford University Press  2009 )  104 ;  L  Green ,  ‘ Jurisprudence for Foxes ’ ( 2012 )  3  Transna-
tional Legal Theory  150, 157 – 58 . 
  7  See  G  Samuel ,  ‘ Science, Law and History: Historical Jurisprudence and Modern Legal Theory ’ 
( 1990 )  41  Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly  1, 2 ( ‘ The modern view is, on the whole, that history 
itself cannot provide a philosophy of law ’ );  AT  Kronman ,  ‘ Precedent and Tradition ’ ( 1990 )  99 
 Yale Law Journal  1029, 1058 ( ‘ Professional philosophy  … grants the past no more authority than 
chemistry and physics do, and like them insists that its own accomplishments be judged solely in 
accordance to the timeless criterion of truth. ’ ). 
  8  Jeremy Waldron, for example, reported that some think the ahistoricity of jurisprudence is 
 ‘ a good thing: it means we can study the problems of legal philosophy directly, undistracted by 
a purely antiquarian interest in the history of ideas ’ . But Waldron criticised such views as lead-
ing to discussions that are  ‘ fl at and repetitive ’ . See  J  Waldron ,  ‘ Legal and Political Philosophy ’ in 
 JL  Coleman and  SJ  Shapiro (eds),  The Oxford Handbook of  Jurisprudence and Philosophy of  
Law ( Oxford University Press  2002 )  352, 381 (hereinafter  Oxford Handbook ). Outside the world of 
analytic jurisprudence, this criticism has been more common. See, eg,  B  Edgeworth ,  ‘ Legal Positiv-
ism and the Philosophy of Language: A Critique of HLA Hart ’ s Descriptive Sociology ’ ( 1986 )  6  Legal 
Studies  115, 125 ;  MJ  Horwitz ,  ‘ Why Is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical ? ’ ( 1997 )  17 
 Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies  551, 564 – 65 . For a recent attempt by a socio-legal scholar to revive 
historical jurisprudence, see  BZ  Tamanaha ,  A Realistic Theory of  Law ( Cambridge University 
Press  2017 )  chs 1 ,  4 . 
are no different. HLA Hart once wrote that  ‘ [a]nalytical and historical inquir-
ies provide answers to different questions not different answers to the same 
questions ’ . 4 Sixty years later Andrei Marmor expressed a similar sentiment 
when he wrote,  ‘ [t]he motivation for claiming that  P is one thing, and the truth 
of  P is another. The former is the business of intellectual historians. Philosophy 
should be interested in truth. ’ 5 
 Ignoring history, you might say, is exactly what gives philosophy its raison 
d ’ ê tre, it is precisely what distinguishes the philosophical study of social insti-
tutions from all others. Indeed, to the extent that legal philosophers should 
seek to identify the features that all laws necessarily have, 6 history looks like a 
distraction. This is not meant to denigrate either method or form of inquiry, 
just to say that they are different and broadly independent of each other. Legal 
theorists and legal historians (including historians of jurisprudence) should 
therefore go on pursuing their valuable interests without caring much about 
the others ’ work. For quite some time, this has been, I think, the dominant 
view. 7 
 But can philosophers of law really insulate their inquiries from law ’ s history, 
from the temporal element of law ? And should they ? Is there any basis for 
thinking that the philosophy of law may be different on this score from some 
other areas of philosophy ? Despite the dominance of the ahistorical approach, 
several legal philosophers have been critical of the almost complete separation 
between the two inquiries. 8 Few have thought about these questions harder than 
Gerald Postema, who explored this question in different ways both in his work 
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  9  I express my appreciation for Postema ’ s contribution to the study of Bentham in D Priel, 
 ‘ Bentham ’ s Public Utilitarianism and Its Jurisprudential Signifi cance ’ (forthcoming). 
  10  See  GJ  Postema ,  ‘ Law as Command: The Model of Command in Modern Jurisprudence ’ 
( 2001 )  11  Philosophical Issues  470, 470 – 75 . 
  11  Showing that serves an additional purpose. I have complained elsewhere about the isolationism 
of contemporary legal philosophy. See Priel (n 3) 98 – 109. One way of demonstrating this isolation is 
by showing how unaware are legal philosophers of the origins of jurisprudential ideas they treat as 
path breaking. 
  12  See, eg, LJ Green and B Leiter, Letter to the Editor,  ‘ H.L.A. Hart and  “ The Concept of Law ” ’ 
 Times Literary Supplement (London, 11 March 2005) 15, 15 ( ‘ [Hart]  … transformed the discipline of 
jurisprudence. What had been a dilettantish pastime for law teachers and retired judges, an undisci-
plined jumble of history, speculative sociology, legal doctrine and party politics, became technical and 
rigorous branch of philosophy. ’ );  J  Murphy and  JL  Coleman ,  Philosophy of  Law:  An Introduction 
( rev edn ,  Westview  1990 )  26 – 27 . 
on general jurisprudence and in his work explicating the philosophy of the 
common law and that of the common law ’ s greatest hater, Jeremy Bentham. 9 
 I aim to explore some of these questions in this chapter, partly by engaging in 
Postema ’ s work on this topic. But the chapter pays tribute to his work in another 
way. Though he sees himself as a philosopher and not a historian of ideas, 
Postema ’ s work shows more sensitivity than is common in most contemporary 
legal philosophy to the historically-situated nature of philosophical work. What 
he did in relation to Matthew Hale and Jeremy Bentham, I aspire to do in this 
chapter with respect to aspects of twentieth-century jurisprudence. Because 
contemporary legal philosophy is written in a self-consciously ahistorical 
style, it invites an ahistorical assessment of its products. This chapter seeks to 
contribute to a better historical understanding of analytic jurisprudence itself 
by tying its emergence to a particular intellectual climate. Finally, this chapter 
also turns to the history of philosophy to trace the origins of some popular 
jurisprudential ideas. Just as Postema has shown that, contrary to prevailing 
belief among legal philosophers, the idea of law as command was not invented 
by Thomas Hobbes, 10 I want to show that some well-known jurisprudential 
ideas have a long history outside of jurisprudence. To that end, I show (with 
the aid of what may be an unseemly large number of block quotations) just how 
similar are some of the views expressed within analytic jurisprudence to ideas 
we encounter, sometimes centuries earlier, in other areas of philosophy. This 
serves yet another goal, one refl ected in the title of this volume, that of seeing 
the connections between legal philosophy and some of the central questions in 
other areas of philosophy. 11 
 II. JURISPRUDENCE AS A PROGRESSIVE SCIENCE 
 To some of Hart ’ s admirers, his most important contribution to jurisprudence 
has not been any of his central substantive ideas but the way he oriented juris-
prudence towards analytic philosophy and (for lack of a better term) its ethos. 12 
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  13  H  Putnam ,  ‘ Convention: A Theme in Philosophy ’ ( 1981 )  13  New Literary History  1, 10 – 11 . 
  14  See  HLA  Hart ,  The Concept of  Law ( 3rd edn ,  Oxford University Press  2012 )  239 . 
  15  See  ‘ Hart Interviewed: HLA Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman ’ (2005) 32  Journal of  
Law and Society 267, 290. 
  16  ibid 292;  contra L Green,  ‘ Introduction ’ in Hart (n 14) xv, xlvii. 
  17  See  HLA  Hart ,  Essays on Bentham:  Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory ( Clarendon 
Press  1982 )  28 ;  D  Priel ,  ‘ The Place of Legitimacy in Legal Theory ’ ( 2011 )  57  McGill Law Journal  1, 
14 – 18 . 
  18  It is important to stress that jurisprudence is modelled after science only in these specifi c 
senses. In other senses, much contemporary jurisprudence remains staunchly resistant to the infl u-
ence of the natural sciences. See  D  Priel ,  ‘ Jurisprudence Between Science and the Humanities ’ 
( 2012 )  4  Washington University Jurisprudence Review  269, 301 – 07 . The present chapter aims to 
make sharper the tension within this ambivalent attitude toward science. 
Hilary Putnam captured well that ethos, especially around the middle of the 
twentieth century, the time Hart was making his most infl uential contributions: 
 (1) Analytical philosophy is nonideological, which means above all that it is nonpo-
litical and nonmoralizing. (2) Analytical philosophy consists of piecemeal problem 
solving.  … (3) Analytical philosophy for a long time regarded value theory as second-
class philosophy, and a concern with literature, the arts, culture, and the history of 
culture as at best optional for an analytical philosopher (although this has begun to 
change as a result of the publication of John Rawls ’ s  A Theory of  Justice  … ). 13 
 There can be little doubt that at least in the English-speaking world, it was Hart ’ s 
work more than anyone else ’ s that gave the impetus for aligning jurisprudence 
with developments in twentieth-century philosophy, making jurisprudence 
almost synonymous with legal  philosophy . And indeed, the central features of 
analytic philosophy that Putnam identifi ed are also an excellent summary of 
Hart ’ s conception of jurisprudence: Hart stated that his inquiry is  ‘ general and 
descriptive ’ , 14 which he took to be morally and politically neutral. Hart also 
embraced the idea of piecemeal progress: In an interview he gave late in his 
life, he was explicit that analytic philosophy  ‘ is suspicious of grand theory if it 
comes along too soon and obscures valuable distinctions ’ , 15 and that he himself 
 ‘ had no part in that sort of thing ’ . 16 Putnam ’ s third point is also prominent in 
Hart ’ s work. His most important work appeared in the two decades prior to the 
publication of  A Theory of  Justice and it generally avoided questions of value. 
Hart later stated that he thought that analysing law and politics using  ‘ so far as 
possible a morally neutral vocabulary  … [to be] the sane and healthy centre ’ of 
legal positivism. 17 
 It may be a measure of Hart ’ s enormous impact on the fi eld that Putnam ’ s 
three characteristics remain dominant in contemporary jurisprudence, often 
presupposed rather than defended. So understood, legal philosophy (like much 
of philosophy more generally) is in  one important sense modelled after the natu-
ral sciences: in terms of its aims, it seeks to provide an accurate description of 
what law is; in terms of its methodological aspirations, it is to be as value neutral 
as good science is. 18 Scientifi c inquiry, specifi cally about the nature of chemi-
cal substances, provides a good analogy for this approach to jurisprudence. 
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  19  See  LD  d ’ Almeida ,  ‘ Book Review ’ ( 2015 )  78  Modern Law Review  699, 707 ( ‘ What matters is 
whether there is philosophical progress to be made by working on [the ideas of earlier thinkers]  … 
[Legal philosophers] are concerned with the same thing Raz is concerned with. They are concerned 
with getting things right. ’ ). See also text to n 5. 
Gold can be shaped in different ways (coins, rings, bullion); the cultural signifi -
cance of gold has also changed throughout history. But underneath these 
differences there remains the essence of gold, unchanging throughout history, 
and completely independent of human knowledge of it. 
 The progressive-science model of jurisprudence adopts the same view with 
respect to law. Underneath the superfi cial differences that distinguish one law 
or legal system from others, there is a fundamental, unchanging core; and this 
unchanging core is unaffected by misconceptions, no matter how commonly 
held. If there is, for example, a necessary connection between law and morality, 
that remains the case even if all humans think otherwise. By the same token, 
biographical data on Hobbes or Bentham, or contextual information about 
debates they had with their contemporaries, bear as much relevance to jurispru-
dence as the question whether an apple fell on Newton ’ s head or whether Galileo 
dropped two cannon balls from a tower in Pisa has to the truth of gravity. 
 This approach has a similar response to legal change. It is not that laws, or 
even that prevailing ideas about law, do not change. Rather, the thought is that 
underneath these changes, there is a single, unchanging nature that law in all 
times and places possesses, one that exists, as it were, outside of time and space. 
On this view, the most signifi cant sense in which time fi gures in jurisprudential 
inquiry is that different scholars work to discover the nature of one object by 
exploring some questions pursued by their predecessors, on whose answers they 
hope to build. Thus, John Austin and Jeremy Bentham pointed out errors in 
then-prevailing natural law theories, Hart improved on Austin and Bentham by 
correcting their errors and so on. Progress in this kind of inquiry is attained by 
adopting a problem-solving, knowledge-accumulating inquiry, one in which the 
bigger picture about law is generated out of solutions to smaller questions such 
as what an obligation, a right or a duty are. 
 This model of inquiry explains why legal philosophers are generally 
 uninterested in the history of law: They focus on the timeless, whereas historians 
are interested in change. It also explain legal philosophers ’ lack of interest in 
the history of jurisprudence. No one denies the genius of Newton or Darwin or 
their epoch-making contributions to physics and biology, but these days scien-
tists do not turn to them for answers to open questions in physics or biology, 
because physical and biological knowledge has progressed far beyond them. 
Their insights have been accepted and added to the store of knowledge, built 
upon, and in important respects also superseded and corrected. Similarly, on the 
model of philosophy as a progressive science, philosophers today know more and 
have advanced far beyond Hobbes, Hume, Bentham or Kant, so there is relatively 
little to learn from them that could assist in addressing contemporary debates. 19 
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  20  J  Gardner ,  Law as a Leap of  Faith:  Essays on Law in General ( Oxford University Press  2012 ) 
 297, fn  75 . 
  21  It is common to fi nd contemporary scholars discussing the works of John Austin in order to 
learn from his mistakes. See  SJ  Shapiro ,  Legality ( Harvard University Press  2011 )  59 (despite its many 
errors  ‘ Austin ’ s theory of law presents us with a tremendous learning opportunity ’ ). Of course, Hart 
used Austin ’ s ideas for a similar purpose, and he was not even the fi rst to do so. See  HF  Jolowicz , 
 Lectures on Jurisprudence , ed  JA  Jolowicz ( Cambridge University Press  1963 )  15 (based on lectures 
delivered between 1924 and 1948) ( ‘ [Austin ’ s] theories represent a very defi nite and clear conception 
which, in outline at least, is easy to grasp  … Austin ’ s doctrine forms a very good target  – we must set 
it up and see it clearly in order to throw bricks at it ’ ). 
  22  Bernard Williams (n 2) 478, described the view as asking us  ‘ to read something by Plato  “ as 
though it had come out in  Mind last month ” ’ . Williams criticised this view, which he associated with 
the  ‘ heyday of confi dence in what has been called the  “ analytic history of philosophy ” ’ . 
  23  cf  H  Kelsen ,  ‘ The Pure Theory of Law: Its Methods and Fundamental Concepts ’ ( 1934 )  50  Law 
Quarterly Review  474, 483 – 84 (a brief narrative of jurisprudential progress, in which natural law 
was replaced with positivist theory, then refi ned by Kelsen ’ s pure theory of law). 
  24  J  Raz ,  Between Authority and Interpretation ( Oxford University Press  2009 )  57 – 58 ; see also 
 J  Dickson ,  ‘ The Central Questions of Legal Philosophy ’ ( 2003 )  56  Current Legal Problems 
 63, 85 – 90 . Like Raz, Dickson insists that this view does not challenge the enterprise  ‘ understanding 
the nature of law by identifying and explaining its essential [ie timeless] properties ’ : ibid 90. 
 Thus, in the course of defending such a conception of legal philosophy, John 
Gardner rhetorically asked,  ‘ Why tackle today ’ s problems, the possibly tran-
sient concerns of the early twenty-fi rst century, at the expense of the timeless 
problems that were also of interest to Plato, Confucius, and Maimonides ? ’ 20 
But if one wonders why the writings of Confucius, Maimonides (and even 
Plato) are so rarely discussed in contemporary jurisprudence, the progressive-
science approach has a ready response. On the  ‘ timeless questions ’ that legal 
philosophy deals with, there has been so much advance since the days of ancient 
philosophers that there is not much to gain from reading them. Looking at their 
work may serve a pedagogical purpose, it may help in avoiding some pitfalls, 21 
but not much else. 
 To be sure, one still fi nds occasional references to historical fi gures, but there 
is little interest in reading them in the context of the intellectual debates of their 
day. To the extent that we should care about what they wrote, it is for their abil-
ity to contribute to contemporary debates. 22 As a result, to the extent that we 
encounter jurisprudential history in most contemporary work, it is a simplistic 
history in which whole centuries are reduced to a few sentences. 23 
 To proponents of this view, the only minor concession to history seems to 
be the acknowledgement that the  practice of jurisprudence (and philosophy 
more generally) is the product of changes in the interests of their audiences. 
This means some questions will be explored in certain times but not in others, 
and may make what counts as a good explanation of law relative to a time and a 
place, but  ‘ there is nothing in the relativity of good explanations to their public 
to threaten the non-relativity of truth ’ . 24 
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  25  JE  Toews ,  ‘ Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the 
Irreducibility of Experience ’ ( 1987 )  92  American Historical Review  879, 905 . The book referred to in 
the quote is  R  Rorty et al (eds),  Philosophy in History:  Essays on the Historiography of  Philosophy 
( Cambridge University Press  1984 ) . 
  26  GJ  Postema ,  ‘ The Data of Jurisprudence ’ ( 2018 )  95  Washington University Law Review  1083, 
1088 . Postema adds (ibid),  ‘ The long tradition of philosophy is the tradition of engaging continu-
ally with its tradition, and this engagement of philosophy in its history is always philosophical, and 
hence resolutely critical. ’ 
  27  See  Q  Skinner ,  Visions of  Politics:  Regarding Method ( Cambridge University Press  2002 )  59 – 61 . 
 III. JURISPRUDENCE AS INTERPRETATION OF A SOCIAL PRACTICE 
 Not everyone agrees with the view of philosophy as a progressive science. 
In  section II , I quoted Putnam ’ s description of the central features of analytic 
philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s. A decade or so after Putnam wrote these 
words, a new understanding of philosophy (re-)emerged: 
 There is a consensus, at least among [the] select group of philosophers [who contrib-
uted to  Philosophy in History ], that the discipline of philosophy as recently practiced 
in the Anglo-American context has been much too narrow in scope and outrageously 
pretentious and anachronistic in its claims. It has focused on obscure linguistic 
and logical issues tied to the epistemological project of articulating the conditions 
of certain knowledge, defi ned these issues as the eternal questions of philosophy, 
and reconstructed the history of philosophy as successive attempts to answer these 
questions. The historical perspective is put into operation to reveal the historically 
contingent nature of this defi nition of philosophy and philosophical problems, to 
open up the discipline to a range of new questions (relating to the interpretation 
of meaning, ethics, and politics) as well as to methods for approaching and writ-
ing about such questions. At issue is not simply the revision and enrichment of the 
history of philosophy through the expansion of its canon of relevant thinkers and 
questions, but the reformulation of the nature of philosophy as a cultural activity. 
The conventional analytic distinction between the validity and the historical genesis 
of truth claims is rejected. 25 
 Postema recently endorsed such a view when he wrote that  ‘ philosophy [in 
general] is constitutionally  historical ’ . 26 There is a weak and strong way of 
understanding this more historically-informed approach to the study of ideas. 
The weak version asserts that to comprehend what, say, Hobbes wrote, we 
should not think of him as engaged in debates that were hardly conceived of 
when he was writing. 27 In this weak version, even philosophers who think they 
are engaged in timeless questions, even those who think they are writing for the 
ages, are products of their age, and their works may be far more parochial than 
they are aware of. Thus, to understand Hobbes, we should pay attention to his 
actual debates with his contemporaries, not to conjectured debates with ours. 
 This mildly historicist view is still consistent with the idea that there is a 
core of fairly stable philosophical questions that philosophers have always been 
concerned with, as well as that law ’ s nature remains constant. One needs to 
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  28  ibid 88.  Q  Skinner ,  ‘ Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas ’ ( 1969 )  8  History and 
Theory  3, 5, 50 . Skinner here was explicitly following Collingwood. On the signifi cance of this point, 
see the discussion in text accompanying nn 35 – 39 below. 
  29  See Skinner (n 27) 103, 177. 
  30  J  Gardner ,  ‘ Why Law Might Emerge: Hart ’ s Problematic Fable ’ in  LD  d ’ Almeida et al (eds), 
 Reading HLA Hart ’ s  The Concept of Law ( Hart Publishing  2013 )  81, 96 . 
  31  cf  Dan  Priel ,  ‘ HLA Hart and the Invention of Legal Philosophy ’ ( 2011 )  5  Problema  301 . 
be better versed in the historical context in which particular theorists wrote to 
understand how past thinkers sought to answer these questions, but the ques-
tions remain enduring. So understood, this critique of timeless philosophy is 
rather limited. That is why it is better to understand the historicist critique as 
presenting a stronger challenge. It is not just that the  answers philosophers offer 
are contextual, their  questions and  object are contextual too. It makes little 
sense to study Plato as if he is addressing contemporary philosophical concerns, 
because the questions and problems that past philosophers have addressed were 
the questions and problems of their time. In a famous critique of the timeless 
approach to the study of past thinkers, Quentin Skinner attacked the tendency 
to think of philosophical classics as concerned with  ‘ timeless questions and 
answers ’ , arguing that there are no  ‘ perennial problems in philosophy ’ . 28 On the 
basis of a very similar foundation of Hart ’ s work  – the philosophy of language of 
Wittgenstein and JL Austin  – Skinner has doubted the very possibility of  ‘ trying 
defi nitely to fi x the analysis of key moral terms. ’ 29 These different contexts and 
concerns suggest that the subject-matter of inquiry, despite being denoted with 
the same word, is not the same. 
 Now comes a surprise. For many of those who have supported the progressive-
science conception of jurisprudence have also emphasised its  ‘ hermeneutic ’ 
(in plainer English,  ‘ interpretive ’ ) nature. This is surprising because a herme-
neutic understanding of jurisprudence seems closer to the contextual inquiry 
considered here, and thus to push against the progressive-science model. To 
demonstrate this tension, I will make a detour to the philosophy of history, an 
area of philosophy not frequently discussed together with jurisprudence, but 
which I think bears important resemblance to some debates in jurisprudence, 
and one that is particularly pertinent in the context of examining the relation-
ship between jurisprudence and time. This detour will show another benefi t of 
greater familiarity with the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of history. 
As mentioned, the ahistorical conception of jurisprudence tends to be uninter-
ested in the subject ’ s own history. Consequently,  The Concept of  Law ends up 
being treated as a book that fi rst mapped an uncharted land, nothing less than 
 ‘ an authentic  “ Eureka! ” moment in the history of ideas ’ , 30 ignoring its own 
intellectual history. 31 Examining that reveals a book that is far less original than 
it is often taken to be. One aim of the ensuing discussion is that ideas treated as 
philosophical breakthroughs were familiar in other areas of philosophy when 
Hart wrote them. 
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  32  Hart (n 14) vi (emphasis added). 
  33  HLA  Hart ,  Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy ( Clarendon Press  1983 )  13 . 
  34  SJ  Shapiro ,  ‘ The Bad Man and the Internal Point of View ’ in  SJ  Burton (ed),  The Path of the 
Law  and Its Infl uence: The Legacy of  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr ( Cambridge University Press  2000 ) 
 197, 197 . 
 If  one thinks of jurisprudence (as Kelsen did) as the science of norms, one 
that is in no way dependent on any psychological attitudes or any  ‘ internal 
point of view ’ , the disregard of the philosophy of history seems to make sense. 
But if one thinks of law as a social phenomenon, and jurisprudence as part 
of the effort of explaining it, then the connection with history and its philo-
sophical study becomes more apparent. For history is the attempt to explain 
human actions, to describe historical processes; against this, the philosophy 
of history asks what constitutes a good explanation of these  ‘ historical ’ 
events. Law involves human action, which jurisprudence tries to organise and 
explain. Methodological debates in jurisprudence then ask what constitutes 
a good explanation of these  ‘ legal ’ events. So understood, jurisprudence and 
the philosophy of history can be seen as branches of the philosophy of social 
explanation. One particular question asked in both areas has to do with the 
applicability of explanatory methods and models derived from the natural 
sciences to human affairs. 
 This is the relevant intellectual backdrop for considering Hart ’ s methodo-
logical insistence on the importance of accounting for the  ‘ internal aspect ’ of 
human action. In the Preface to  The Concept of  Law , Hart wrote that the 
book could be understood as an essay in  ‘ descriptive sociology ’ . And the proper 
way to do  that , he wrote, requires recognising that  ‘ neither law  nor any other 
form of  social structure can be understood without an appreciation of certain 
crucial distinctions between two different kinds of statement, which I have 
called  “ internal ” and  “ external ” and which can both be made whenever social 
rules are observed ’ . 32 As the italicised words make clear, Hart was here making 
a general claim about the explanation of all social phenomena. It is the inherent 
inadequacy of external explanations that led Hart to say a few decades later 
that the methods of the  ‘ empirical sciences are useless ’ for explaining norma-
tive behaviour. 33 
 Hart considered the  ‘ internal point of view ’ the most important idea of 
 The Concept of  Law . Others concurred: Scott Shapiro, for example, described it 
as  ‘ perhaps Hart ’ s greatest contribution to jurisprudential theory ’ . 34 Historical 
context helps put this idea in its place. Writing some years before Hart, the 
Oxford philosopher and historian RG Collingwood had this to say of the task 
of the historian: 
 The historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a distinction between what 
may be called the outside and the inside of an event. By the outside of the even 
I mean everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their 
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  36  ibid 214 – 15. Compare this to Hart ’ s remarks on the explanation of human action in Hart (n 14) 
88 – 90. 
  37  Collingwood ’ s views were further defended in  W  Dray ,  Laws and Explanation in History 
( Clarendon Press  1957 ) 124, 128, 130, 133; and  PH  Nowell-Smith ,  ‘ Are Historical Events Unique ? ’ 
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 Hart and  AM  Honor é ,  Causation in the Law ( Clarendon Press  1959 ) 8, fn 3. 
movements  … By the inside of the event I mean that in it which can only be described 
in terms of thought  … [The historian ’ s work] may begin by discovering the outside 
of an event, but it can never end there; he must always remember that the event was 
an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action, to discern the 
thought of its agent. In the case of nature, this distinction between the outside and 
the inside of an event does not arise. The events of nature are mere events, not the acts 
of agents whose thought the scientist endeavours to trace. 35 
 To anyone with even a passing familiarity with Anglophone jurisprudence of 
the last few decades, these words are bound to sound familiar, as will also be the 
following words: 
 In thus penetrating to the inside of events and detecting the thought which they 
express, the historian is doing something which the scientist need not and cannot 
do.  … [T]he historian need not and cannot (without ceasing to be an historian) 
emulate the scientist in searching for the causes or laws of events. For science, the 
event is discovered by perceiving it, and the further search for its cause is conducted 
by assigning to it its class and determining the relation between that class and 
others. For history, the object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the thought 
expressed in it. To discover that thought is already to understand it. After the histo-
rian has ascertained the facts, there is no further process of inquiring into their 
causes. When he knows what happened, he already knows why it happened  … The 
cause of [an] event, for [a historian], means the thought in the mind of the person 
by whose agency the event came about: and this is not something other than the 
event, it is the inside of the event itself. 36 
 Collingwood, like Hart after him, was trying to articulate the idea that to under-
stand human action is to understand  ‘ the thought in the mind ’ of the person 
who made it in terms of reasons for action. That is a classic statement of a 
humanistic conception of social explanation, concerned not with identifying 
some general laws of human behaviour, nor with predicting human action, but 
with  ‘ the inside of events ’ . In both history and jurisprudence, this view has been 
the basis for challenges to attempts to align these disciplines with the natural 
sciences. 
 It is quite clear that Hart was familiar, at least indirectly, with Collingwood ’ s 
views. 37 But the origins of the internal point of view are far older than that. The 
distinction between an internal and an external point of view, and the insist-
ence of the importance of the former for the explanation of purposive human 
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  41  See Hart (n 33) 13; see also ibid 162. 
behaviour can be traced to eighteenth-century German philosophy. Here is how 
a modern commentator summarised the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder 
(1744 – 1803): 
 [W]hat distinguishes human agency, so Herder argued, is its capacity for meaning, 
for which the use of language is crucial and no naturalistic, mechanical account of 
language is adequate to capture that sense of meaning. What we mean by words 
depends on an irreducible sense of normativity in their use, and our grasp of such 
normativity itself depends on our immersion in a way of life (a  ‘ culture ’ ), which 
functions as a background to all our more concrete uses of language. Since meaning 
and the expression of meaning is critical to understanding agency, and meaning is 
irreducibly normative, no third-person, purely objective understanding of agency 
is possible; one must understand both the agent ’ s culture and the agent himself as 
an individual from the  ‘ inside, ’ not from any kind of external, third-person point 
of view. 38 
 Herder was one of the founders of the study of  ‘ hermeneutics ’ , the theory of 
interpretation of texts and, eventually, of all human action and history. These 
ideas were then taken up by others. Worthy of a longer discussion than I give 
him here is Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 – 1911). Dilthey is signifi cant, because he 
serves as one possible link between German philosophy and Collingwood, and 
thus Oxford. 39 Dilthey is especially interesting because in his work he contrasted 
what he called  ‘ explanatory psychology ’ , whose methods and aspirations were 
borrowed from the natural sciences, with a different approach, which he called 
 ‘ descriptive and analytic ’ psychology, which was the appropriate method for 
humanistic study. 40 Even if coincidental, the similarity between this and Hart ’ s 
terminology for his own work as both descriptive sociology and analytic philos-
ophy is noteworthy. 
 I do not suggest any stronger infl uence, as demonstrating that is always 
tricky. To the best of my knowledge, Hart never made any reference in his 
writings to the work of either Herder or Dilthey; and I am not claiming any 
unacknowledged borrowing on his part. I doubt that Hart would have found 
everything Herder or Dilthey wrote congenial. However, it is inescapable that 
Hart explicitly associated himself with a  ‘ hermeneutic ’ approach. 41 Though 
he made the reference only quite late in his career, and possibly after seeing 
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it in others ’ discussion of his work, 42 this was no accidental reference. It fi ts 
with ideas that we do know Hart was familiar with coming from the work of 
Wittgenstein (both directly and via the work of Peter Winch), as well as Max 
Weber and Collingwood. 43 (In  section IV , I suggest another possible source for 
Hart ’ s method.) 
 In somewhat different ways, these thinkers have distinguished between 
 ‘ explanation ’ ( Erkl ä ren ), relevant for accounting for the natural world, and 
 ‘ understanding ’ ( Verstehen ) as its equivalent in the domain of human thought. 44 
One specifi c way in which the distinction between the social scientifi c and the 
hermeneutic methods of inquiry has been drawn was in terms of a categori-
cal distinction between reasons and causes: the natural world was governed by 
causes, social reality was governed by reasons. 45 Consequently, many concluded 
that the attempt to use the methods of the natural sciences to explain human 
action was misconceived. 
 Hart made a few short but quite clear references to this distinction in  The 
Concept of  Law . There is a more elaborate discussion of this point in  Causation 
in the Law , co-authored with Tony Honor é and published two years earlier. 
In that book, drawing explicitly on contemporary writings in the philosophy 
of history, Hart and Honor é argued that law, like history, is concerned with 
the explanation of human events, and more specifi cally with  particular human 
events. 46 As such, they argued that human action cannot be explained in terms 
of general causal laws of the kind that we fi nd in the natural sciences. 
Analytic Jurisprudence in Time 225
  47  See Raz (n 24) 48, fn 5. Raz has in fact argued that Hart ’ s rejection of the methods of the  natural 
sciences did not go far enough. He attributed Hart ’ s errors to his  ‘ adherence to naturalism and 
empiricist epistemology, and his rejection of evaluative objectivity ’ : ibid 52. 
  48  J  Raz ,  Ethics in the Public Domain:  Essays in the Morality of  Law and Politics ( rev edn , 
 Clarendon Press  1995 )  237 . And see further his remarks in Raz (n 24) 96 – 97, where he says that 
 ‘ the way a culture understands its own practices and institutions is not separate from what they are ’ . 
See also  L  Green ,  ‘ The Concept of Law Revisited ’ ( 1996 )  94  Michigan Law Review  1687, 1717 (the 
value of jurisprudential inquiry lies in  ‘ help[ing] us understand our institutions and, through them, 
our culture ’ ). Add to it that jurisprudential thought is part of that culture and the diffi culties with 
timeless jurisprudence become evident. For comparison, substitute  ‘ art ’ for  ‘ law ’ . 
  49  Collingwood (n 35) 205. 
  50  See ibid. 
  51  MN  Forster ,  ‘ Introduction ’  in  JG  von Herder ,  Philosophical Writings , ed and tr  MN  Forster 
( Cambridge University Press  2002 ) vii, xiv – xv, xxv;  I  Berlin ,  Three Critics of  the Enlightenment:  Vico, 
Hamann, Herder ( 2nd edn ,  Princeton University Press  2013 ) 232 – 37. Consequently, according to 
Berlin’s reading of Herder,  ‘ [p]articular words are used in communicating particular experiences as a 
result of  … environmental factors  … or of psychological ones; or of mere chance; or of the decisions of 
human beings, who acquiring some terms by  ‘ natural ’ means  … invent others as they please, arbi-
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of Enlightenment historiography ’ ). But even Berlin ’ s critics acknowledge that later scholars, espe-
cially Dilthey, accepted some of the views Berlin attributed to Herder. See Norton ( ‘ The Myth of the 
Counter-Enlightenment ’ ) 652. 
 Hart is not alone in associating jurisprudence with hermeneutics. After a 
heavily Kelsen-inspired (and quite clearly anti-hermeneutic) stage in his early 
work, Joseph Raz moved much closer to interpretivism, including drawing a link 
between jurisprudence and hermeneutics. 47 Raz argued that jurisprudence aimed 
at illuminating an aspect of human life by trying to  ‘ advance our understand-
ing of society by helping us understand how people understand themselves ’ . 48 
He contrasted this form of explanation with the explanation of electrons, whose 
nature is independent of what people think about them. Once again, these 
ideas will sound familiar to those who know Collingwood ’ s views on histori-
cal explanation, which he justifi ed by the human desire for self-knowledge. 
 ‘ Self-knowledge ’ , he explained, does not mean knowledge of humans ’  ‘ bodily 
nature ’ , nor does it mean knowledge of sensation and emotion (as such), but 
rather it is  ‘ knowledge of [humans ’ ] knowing faculties, [their] thought or under-
standing or reasons ’ . 49 This knowledge, Collingwood believed, could not be 
attained by imitating the methods of the natural sciences. 50 
 It is time to return to the problem raised earlier. From a hermeneutic perspec-
tive, the separation between legal philosophy and legal history, and with it the 
search for timeless truths, looks suspect. The hermeneutic, internal approach 
has been a central plank of Herder ’ s philosophy of history, and served him to 
argue that different nations and different cultures are fundamentally differ-
ent, and that therefore they can only be understood by attending to their own 
self-understandings. 51 Since important social practices like law are bound with 
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different groups ’ culture and history, they are embedded in their particular 
historical context. And indeed, the central ideas of the German historical school 
of jurisprudence can be traced to Herder ’ s writings about nation and national 
spirit. 52 In more modern parlance, we would speak of law as a product of, or at 
least imbued by, local culture, precisely what hermeneuticists have maintained 
an  ‘ external ’ , scientifi c perspective cannot adequately account for. 
 All this has profound signifi cance for thinking about jurisprudence in time, 
since it is a central point of historical thinking from the internal point of view 
that it is wrong to seek law-like universal explanations of historical phenomena 
and ideas, and that it is wrong to think about concepts, practices, institutions 
and ideas outside time. Thus, to fully understand Roman law, one has to under-
stand the particular cultural context in which it existed. And this goes beyond 
understanding the cultural signifi cance of particular legal institutions that 
Roman law recognised (eg slavery). It goes to the way the Romans understood 
the idea of law and its place within the universe. If, for example, some form 
of natural law theory was dominant among Roman lawyers, this is not just a 
sociological observation, which we can judge as a mistaken belief about the 
timeless nature of law. Rather, we must try and understand how this fact fi gured 
in Romans ’ understanding and practice of law  ‘ from the internal point of view ’ . 
 IV. RECONCILIATION ? 
 The story so far: There is an  ‘ offi cial view ’ according to which history does not 
matter to jurisprudence, as the two are largely independent inquiries. But under-
neath it lurks a different story, where it seems history plays a more signifi cant 
role. In describing Herder ’ s thought, one commentator wrote that 
 he takes relatively little interest in the  ‘ great ’ political and military deeds and events 
of history, focusing instead on the  ‘ innerness ’ of history ’ s participants  … Because 
of it, psychology and interpretation inevitably take center-stage in the discipline of 
history for Herder. 53 
 Turning to our time, Collingwood ’ s ideas served as the inspiration to many in 
the  ‘ Cambridge school ’ of history of ideas, an approach that is most associated 
with the view that political ideas and concepts are embedded in their time. 54 
 Given Hart ’ s views on the necessity of adopting a very similar hermeneutic 
approach to jurisprudence, should the same not be true of jurisprudence ? To put 
it plainly, it is not easy to see a way out of the tension between, on the one hand, 
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a commitment to a hermeneutic methodology, justifi ed by the fact that law is 
a  ‘ self-refl ective activity ’ , and, on the other hand, the claim that legal philoso-
phy is fundamentally different from legal sociology, because it seeks to identify 
the universal and necessary features about law, which exist independently of 
people ’ s attitudes. 
 Here is another way of demonstrating the tension. In presenting the 
progressive-science view of jurisprudence, I wrote in  section II that that view is 
not  ‘ that laws, or even that prevailing ideas about law, do not change. Rather, 
the thought is that underneath these changes, there is a single, unchanging 
nature that law in all times and places possesses, one that exists, as it were, 
outside of time and space. ’ These words keep the prevailing views about law 
completely separate from the nature of law itself. But if, as the hermeneutic 
approach suggests, the nature of law is  constituted by attitudes about the prac-
tice, then the separation breaks down. In that case, it is far more diffi cult to 
think, substantively, that law has an unchanging nature; and methodologically, it 
is far more diffi cult to keep the philosophical search for law ’ s unchanging nature 
separate from the sociological inquiry into changing attitudes about it. 
 Surprisingly, many legal philosophers have adopted these seemingly confl ict-
ing positions without acknowledging, let alone trying to resolve, their tension. 
They in effect hold that the attitudes that happen to be shared by all about law 
(assuming there are any) are also the ones that constitute the nature of law, even 
though stating so may require ignoring people ’ s own views on law ’ s essential 
features (which may change with time and place). One place where this tension 
comes to light is in the reactions of many legal philosophers to the work of 
Ronald Dworkin. While sharing with him the commitment to jurisprudence as a 
hermeneutic (interpretive) enterprise, critics nevertheless dismissed his work as 
not really jurisprudence. In their judgment, Dworkin ’ s work was too local, too 
close to actual practice to count as philosophy. 55 And his view that jurisprudence 
is continuous with legal doctrine 56 was widely criticised as confused. But if legal 
philosophers take their commitment to a hermeneutic approach and the inter-
nal point of view as seriously as they proclaim, then Dworkin seems to have the 
upper hand. For in essence, Dworkin ’ s critics are saying that legal philosophers 
should ignore those attitudes that do not fi t their working assumption that law 
has a single nature. 
 Is there a way of avoiding these problems ? In a book published just two 
years before  The Concept of  Law , Hart ’ s friend and colleague, Peter Strawson, 
made some methodological remarks that might be read as offering a way of 
resolving the tension. In the opening pages of his book  Individuals: An Essay in 
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Descriptive Metaphysics , Strawson explained what he meant by his subtitle by 
drawing the following contrast:  ‘ Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe 
the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is 
concerned to produce a better structure. ’ 57 In explaining how such a  ‘ descriptive ’ 
inquiry is to be done, Strawson wrote that it begins with  ‘ a close examination 
of the actual use of words ’ , as it  ‘ is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in 
philosophy. ’ 58 But because of the depth of the inquiry, he added, one must go 
beyond language. Linguistic practices,  ‘ however revealing at a certain level, are 
apt to assume, and not to expose, those general elements of structure which the 
metaphysician wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display 
itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged. ’ 59 
 This is similar to the distinction legal philosophers draw between what they 
are doing (conceptual analysis) and linguistics. 60 But this does not resolve a 
different diffi culty this approach faces, that of explaining  ‘ conceptual change ’ . 
For even if we go beyond immediate linguistic practices, the possibility of deeper 
conceptual change remains open. Strawson readily acknowledged that concepts 
change,  ‘ though mainly, on the specialist periphery ’ . Nevertheless, 
 it would be a great blunder to think of metaphysics only in this historical style. For 
there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history  – or none 
recorded in histories of thought; there are categories and concepts which, in their 
most fundamental character, change not at all. Obviously these are not the speci-
alities of the most refi ned thinking. They are the commonplaces of the least refi ned 
thinking; and are yet the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most 
sophisticated human beings. 61 
 Strawson ’ s claim, if true, accepts that, in general, social phenomena must be 
understood in their particular context, and that normally that would imply that 
there are no universal explanations of most concepts referring to social insti-
tutions, only culturally-specifi c ones. At the same time, Strawson maintained 
that some exceptional concepts have  ‘ no history ’ , and therefore do not change. 
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The argument now to be made on behalf of Hart and others seeking to combine 
essentialism with hermeneuticism is that law happens to be one of those concepts 
without history. Though he does not say so explicitly in the original text of 
 The Concept of  Law , in the posthumous remarks published as the Postscript to 
the book, Hart said just that:  ‘ in spite of many variations in different cultures 
and in different times, [law] has taken the same general form and structure ’ . 62 
 Admittedly, this remark is made in a different context, so it takes some 
interpretive licence to use it as a basis for extending Strawson ’ s view to Hart. 
The bigger problem is that it is diffi cult to think of law as one of those concepts 
that have no history and that do not change. Law seems to fi t better within 
Strawson ’ s other category of concepts, that of the  ‘ specialities ’ of refi ned think-
ing. For instance, the list of beliefs about law that Hart attributes to  ‘ educated 
people ’ (so neatly matching the questions his book would later address) is in 
some ways representative of the law of a modern state, but does not fi t other 
contexts, as Hart himself conceded when he discussed the law of pre-modern 
societies and international law. 63 This suggests that despite the superfi cial 
similarity between Strawson ’ s descriptive metaphysics and Hart ’ s descriptive 
jurisprudence, the attempt to rely on the former to solve the inherent tension in 
the latter does not work. 
 V. THREE CHALLENGES TO TIMELESS JURISPRUDENCE 
 This failed attempt at reconciliation leaves us where we were before, with what 
looks like an unresolvable tension at the heart of contemporary jurisprudence. 
In this section, I consider three possible ways of confronting this tension, three 
different ways in which time might fi gure more prominently in jurisprudential 
inquiry. First, it might be argued that  as a matter of  fact law has a temporal 
component, and therefore no adequate account of law can fail to acknowledge 
this fact. A second, stronger, claim is that all law  necessarily has a temporal 
component, because law ’ s normative force takes place in time. Finally, one may 
reject the assumption that law has an unchanging nature. Law is always a product 
of a particular culture, and like other cultural phenomena, law has a temporal 
(and geographical) nature. This implies that the proper method for studying law 
should be the same as the one adopted for the study of other cultural phenom-
ena: historical, situated, contingent. It is here that I come to consider Postema ’ s 
contributions to the subject, because in different works he made remarks that 
can be read as supporting all three claims. 
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 A. The Common Law as a Time-Bound Authority 
 One path to challenging the ahistoricity of jurisprudence accepts some version 
of the search for a general, cross-cultural account of law, but insists that, at 
least in some places, law is a time-constrained phenomenon. This challenge 
can be gleaned from Postema ’ s pioneering work on what he called  ‘ common 
law theory ’ . 64 In this vein Postema can be read as arguing that if we look seri-
ously and carefully at past practices that we call  ‘ law ’ , practices that we treat as 
ancestors of those phenomena in today ’ s world that we think of as law, we fi nd 
aspects of them that do not fi t with currently-dominant theories of law. Instead, 
they fi t better into a distinct legal theory. These ideas cannot be dismissed 
(as the progressive-science approach would suggest) as errors of less informed 
individuals. Rather, they look like a relatively coherent and well-worked out 
theory of law. Postema identifi ed in the writings of prominent English lawyers 
like Edward Coke, John Selden and Matthew Hale a distinct theory of law, not 
reducible to either legal positivism or natural law theory. 65 
 At a minimum, this work poses a challenge to those who look at legal posi-
tivism and natural law theory as exhausting the theoretical terrain of theories 
of law, thus showing how a historically-informed philosopher can come to chal-
lenge prevailing views. To illustrate the difference, consider the relationship 
between law and rules. In modern thinking the relationship is axiomatic, indis-
putable. Scott Shapiro, for example, asked,  ‘ what else does the law consist in if 
not  rules ? ’ 66 The answer, common law theorists would have said, is,  ‘ well, not 
rules ’ : In the words of Postema, in this conception of law, law is  ‘ not a set of rules 
or laws, but a practised framework of practical reasoning ’ , which  ‘ constitutes a 
form of social ordering ’ . 67 Thus, greater familiarity with past legal phenomena 
can enrich one ’ s thinking about law. But time fi gures in this challenge in a more 
substantial way: In common law theory, law develops by a slow process of incre-
mental changes and receives its authority neither from its sources (as positivists 
have it) nor from its inherent rationality (as natural law theorists argue), but 
from its historical provenance (and possibly its social acceptance). As Postema 
put it,  ‘ [t]he reason of the Common Law is  … historical ’ . 68 In this conception of 
law, time and history are inherent to the law ’ s authority. 
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  69  For further illustration, in an essay that builds on Postema ’ s work on common law theory, 
see  D  Priel ,  ‘ Not All Law is an Artifact: Jurisprudence Meets the Common Law ’ in  L  Burazin et al 
(eds),  Law as an Artifact ( Oxford University Press  2018 )  239 . 
  70  OW  Holmes ,  The Common Law ( Little ,  Brown  1881 )  77 . Holmes says this with respect to tort 
law, but this is a fair statement of the common law in general. 
  71  Ideas similar to (and to some extent infl uenced by) common law theory developed in nineteenth-
century Germany. The most important fi gure in their development was Friedrich Karl von Savigny. 
Savigny ’ s prominence extended well beyond Germany and even cast some infl uence on common 
law jurisdictions, for example in debates in the United States over codifi cation. See  M  Reimann , 
 ‘ The Historical School Against Codifi cation: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the New York 
Civil Code ’ ( 1989 )  37  American Journal of  Comparative Law  95 . Interestingly, Jhering stated that 
for Savigny  ‘ laws are not  made , but rather  become ’ .  R  Berkowitz ,  ‘ From Justice to Justifi cation: 
An Alternative Genealogy of Positive Law ’ ( 2011 )  1  University of  California at Irvine Law Review 
 611, 625 (quoting  Rudolf  von Jhering ,  ‘ Friedrich Karl Von Savigny ’ ( 1861 )  5  Jahrb ü cher f ü r die 
Dogmatik des heutigen r ö mischen und deutschen Privatrechts  354, 364 – 65 ). This contrast between 
 ‘ being ’ and  ‘ becoming ’ is precisely the one Nietzsche invoked when he criticised philosophers ’ 
 ‘ hatred of the very idea of becoming ’ , in the quotation accompanying n 1. 
  72  For an example of the fi rst strategy see Gardner (n 20) vii – viii (claiming to borrow from both 
legal positivism and natural law); for an example of the second strategy, see  L  Alexander and 
 E  Sherwin ,  The Rule of  Rules:  Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of  Law ( Duke University Press 
 2001 ) 196 – 98. 
 I think Postema ’ s work here served as an important corrective to so much 
contemporary legal theory that either ignores the common law altogether or 
tries to squeeze it into the two more familiar categories. 69 But common law 
theory describes a practice that, in the words of Holmes,  ‘ did not begin with 
a theory ’ , and never fully worked out one. 70 The common law, and its theory, 
remain elusive, because they refl ect a never-ending project, a constant chase after 
decisions, which themselves struggle to catch up with changing reality. It is a 
theory of a practice that is in an important sense opposed to theorising, at least 
the timeless theorising of the kind Nietzsche attacked. 71 On this view, the law 
gets its authority from the environment (and history) in which it exists, but since 
this keeps changing, the law is in an endless chase with reality. 
 B. Three Paths to the Normativity of  Law 
 Recognising that the common law refl ects a distinct approach to the authority 
of law is a good starting point for a broader discussion of the signifi cance of 
time on law ’ s authority. In the last  section I invoked the two war horses of legal 
theory, legal positivism and natural law theory. The standard way of thinking of 
legal positivism and natural law theory is as competing theories, such that if one 
is right, the other is necessarily false. A second approach is to try and reconcile 
them, to suggest that they are complementary in that each contains part of the 
truth, or that they are ways of looking at the same phenomena from different 
perspectives. 72 These solutions are in principle possible when we add common 
law theory to our menu of possible (competing) theories. 
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  73  See Gardner (n 20) 279. 
  74  See Berman (n 65) 1736 – 37. See also n 71 above. 
  75  The link is explicit in Kronman (n 7) 1048 – 64. It also fi gures prominently in critiques of 
Kronman ’ s views. See  D  Luban ,  ‘ Legal Traditionalism ’ ( 1991 )  43  Stanford Law Review  1035, 1055 – 57 ; 
 N  Duxbury ,  ‘ History as Hyperbole ’ ( 1995 )  15  Oxford Journal of  Legal Studies  477, 480 – 82 . 
  76  GJ  Postema ,  ‘ Jurisprudence as Practical Philosophy ’ ( 1998 )  4  Legal Theory  329, 357 . Similarly, in his 
writings on common law theory, the claims about time-boundedness seem to be grounded in features of 
the common law, not all law. See, eg, Postema,  ‘ Classical Common Law (Part II) ’ (n 64) 21 – 23. 
 There is, however, a different way of thinking about these different approaches, 
the one I want to pursue here. And that is that different theories may not equally 
fi t the law in different times and places. So understood, the word  ‘ law ’ will refer to 
several different things that belong to different categories. Some have argued this 
view is incoherent. John Gardner, for instance, stated that  ‘ If law is not a valid 
classifi cation, then nor is Cheyenne law, international law, Scots law, shari ’ a law, 
or Roman law. If there is no general jurisprudence  … then there is also no special 
jurisprudence. ’ 73 But this is a mistake. It is perfectly coherent to think that the word 
 ‘ law ’ is ambiguous, and that different things we call  ‘ law ’ belong to different cate-
gories and that law (in general) is a disjunctive category. It is also possible to tell a 
historical, evolutionary story, in which one dominant form of law replaces another. 
 Where does Postema stand on this debate ? Postema associates the insights of 
the time-based view of law with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English legal 
scholars. One may add to them some members of the historical school of juris-
prudence, particularly dominant in the middle of nineteenth-century Germany. 74 
From the perspective of the progressive-science model of jurisprudence, these 
theories may be understood as correct or incorrect descriptions of what law is, 
but descriptions that leave the practice of law largely intact. But if we take seri-
ously the view that different legal philosophies manifest themselves in different 
understandings or conceptualisations of law and its role in society, different juris-
prudential theories will result in somewhat different legal practices. The main 
proponents of common law theory were lawyers who developed their ideas against 
the background of a particular legal system. They thus had a role both in shaping 
the law and theorising it. This would suggest that it would be diffi cult to see time-
based conceptions of law as capturing the essence of law in times and places where 
other ideas were dominant. Moreover, especially given that appeals to  ‘ tradition ’ 
are almost always bound with a certain view of politics as represented in the work 
of Edmund Burke, 75 it is inviting to think of time-bound authority as refl ecting a 
view that may be true of a particular socio-political tradition, not something that 
captures necessary features of law true in all political environments. 
 Between these two possibilities  – one where the time-boundedness of law is 
one possible conception and one where it is part of the essence of law  – Postema 
is not entirely clear. He writes in one place that  ‘ [t]he philosophical explana-
tion of law  … seeks a general account of a concept deeply embedded in the 
intellectual and political traditions of our culture and the day-to-day activities 
and social interactions shaped by them ’ . 76 At the same time, Postema seems to 
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219 – 25 (quotation at 219). 
  78  GJ  Postema ,  ‘ On the Moral Presence of Our Past ’ ( 1991 )  36  McGill Law Journal  1153, 1156 – 57 . 
  79  On the idea underlying this sentence, see  D  Priel ,  ‘ Are Jurisprudential Debates Conceptual ? 
Some Lessons from Democratic Theory ’ ( 2012 )  50  Osgoode Hall Law Journal  359, 398 – 401 . It is 
further elaborated in D Priel,  ‘ Jurisprudential Theories as Models ’ (unpublished manuscript). 
  80  See Luban (n 75) 1047 – 50. 
  81  See generally  D  Priel ,  ‘ Conceptions of Authority and the Anglo-American Common Law 
Divide ’ ( 2017 )  65  American Journal of  Comparative Law  609 . 
have embraced the view that the normativity of law is necessarily historical. For 
example, he has written about  ‘ [l]aw ’ s essential temporality  … [which] lies in 
the very nature of law and its distinctive mode of normativity ’ . 77 Postema has 
also written about the  ‘ essentially historical ’ nature of law. 78 It is thus unclear 
whether Postema thinks that the time-constrained idea of normativity is unique 
to common law theory, or that this is an idea true of all law even if only common 
law theory made it explicit. 
 I want to propose here yet another way of understanding the relationship 
between natural law theory, legal positivism and common law theory. This 
view sees these as three models of law. 79 Common law theory is thus one of 
(at least) three possible accounts of law ’ s normativity, with law in different times 
and places coming closer to one of the three. On this view, we can distinguish 
between three pure forms of the authority of law: reason-based, will-based, and 
time-based. These correspond, roughly, to natural law theory, legal positivism 
and common law theory. 
 Real-world instantiations of law rarely if ever exhibit pure cases of these 
different approaches. Even within a single legal system, some areas may be closer 
to one type than to another; even within a single legal system some participants 
will push its law in one direction, others in another. Nevertheless, and despite 
the fact that ideas travel (which is why all actual legal systems are the product 
of different and occasionally confl icting infl uences), arguably there will remain 
differences among legal systems in how close they are to each of the different 
pure conceptions. We may think of a  ‘ common law jurisdiction ’ as a legal system 
closer to pure time-based authority, which means there are going to be systemic 
differences between such a legal system and another that is closer to one of the 
other conceptions. At the same time, the model view acknowledges that labels 
are always simplifi cations, and that common law legal systems are complex 
and diverse. For instance, even in common law jurisdictions, much of the law 
today is the product of statutes, and statutes are harder to fi t within a time-
bound conception of law ’ s authority. 80 On the other hand, even the common 
law element in common law jurisdictions may be subject to interpretation and 
reconceptualisation in terms of the other theories of law ’ s authority. 81 
 These last points help bring in an additional timed aspect into our analysis. 
To understand it, I borrow the idea of convergent evolution from biologi-
cal evolutionary theory. In essence, it stands for the possibility that organs 
234 Dan Priel
performing similar functions will evolve in different species completely indepen-
dently. This happens when different species are exposed to similar evolutionary 
pressures. A well-known example is the eye, which evidence strongly suggests 
evolved independently several times. Notably, even though different organs of 
vision perform roughly the same function, they are structured differently and 
they perform their function somewhat differently. 
 Similarly, in the context of law, it is possible that institutions we now collec-
tively call  ‘ law ’ have emerged independently in different societies. The social 
pressures that led to the emergence of legal structures may have been similar 
(a society of growing size and complexity, division of social roles and labour), 
but different background conditions (in existing cultural norms, physical envi-
ronment, technological development) may have led to the emergence of different 
bases for legal authority, and consequently to different legal forms that fi t those 
ideas. As a result, something that may count as law under one type of authority 
may not under another. Unlike the biological case, however, it is easy to conceive 
of different conceptions of authority existing within a single legal system. 
 It is a mix of historical ignorance and the philosophical fetish for the unifi ed 
explanation that explains varied phenomena in terms of one single structure 
( ‘ all law is necessarily X ’ , where X is a set of structural features) that blinded 
philosophers to this possibility. What is true, though, is that with time, partly 
because ideas travel, partly because of convergence in the environmental condi-
tions, partly because even within a single legal system not everyone thinks alike, 
different ideas of authority got blended together, such that modern legal systems 
typically exhibit confl icting ideas of authority. Surprisingly, this may have helped 
make claims to universality seem more plausible, because anyone who sought to 
explain law ’ s authority in terms of one of three possibilities could fi nd some-
thing in any legal system they considered to support their views. However, this is 
where a historical understanding  – one that shows the origins of ideas and their 
evolution  – can explain why ignoring the different conceptions of authority that 
co-exist within a single legal system, leads to error. 
 The suggestion made in the last paragraph is, as presented, rather specula-
tive. It clearly requires a lot more than I can do here to substantiate it, but if it is 
along the right lines then we can make sense of some legal systems ’ being closer 
to, say, reason-based ideas of authority (a legal system grounded more in, and 
thus closer to, natural law theory) while there are others where time-based ideas 
of authority are more prominent (a legal system closer to common law theory). 
This approach may explain how different legal systems emerge and evolve in 
response to particular social pressures, why different theories of law ’ s authority 
may gain prominence in different places or in different times, and how a legal 
system that may begin closer to a particular conception of law ’ s authority will 
drift towards another. It can also makes sense of the fact  – very much confi rmed 
by reality  – that different legal systems do not just differ in their geographical 
scope and in the content of their rules; they sometimes differ also in their under-
lying idea of law. It is this fact that explains why conversation between people 
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and  S  Sciaraffa (eds),  Philosophical Foundations of  the Nature of  Law ( Oxford University Press 
 2013 )  322, 339 – 40 . 
  83  Postema (n 77) 225. 
in different legal systems is sometimes diffi cult, and why this diffi culty extends 
to legal theorists. 82 
 An important possible implication of this view is that the very idea of law 
may not be politically neutral. For if  there are indeed different conceptions 
of law ’ s authority, and if  those different conceptions are plausibly associated 
with different political ideologies, and those correspond to somewhat different 
legal practices, then a legal system more aligned with a particular conception 
of authority may have a different political hue from law instantiated closer 
to another conception. It is not a coincidence, I think, that those who have 
emphasised the time-based conception of law ’ s authority have often found 
the  political ideas of Burke and Oakeshott congenial to their account of law. 
It is also not a coincidence that this brand of conservatism is quite different 
from the conservatism associated with some versions of reason-based natural 
law theory. 
 C. Jurisprudence with Humans 
 The previous subsection presents a view that could be seen to be in confl ict 
with Postema ’ s. I have argued for (at least) three different possible paths to law ’ s 
authority, only one of which is time-based; at least in some places, Postema 
argued that all law ’ s authority is embedded in time. As he put it: 
 Time is essential to law ’ s distinctive normativity. Law is capable of offering effective 
normative guidance to rational self-directing and socially interacting agents only if 
it is suffi ciently congruent with their social lives and the activities and practices that 
structure them through time. 83 
 There are two possible ways of mitigating this apparent disagreement. The fi rst 
is that while I may have provided a  ‘ sociological ’ account of people ’ s beliefs 
about law ’ s authority, Postema ’ s account is philosophical in that it focuses on 
what  actually grounds law ’ s authority. The difference is that to show that my 
view is incorrect takes empirical evidence that will indicate the three different 
views do not actually exist; to show that Postema ’ s view is incorrect calls for a 
refutation of a  ‘ philosophical ’ argument. I will explain below why I reject this 
attempt of reconciling the two views and the sharp distinction that underlies 
it. A second response is quite different, and I believe more promising: it asserts 
that while in theory the three conceptions of law ’ s authority are conceivable, in 
reality, because of the way humans are, law ’ s authority will always be (albeit to 
varying degrees) dependent on time. 
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  84  If the category itself is a social construction, why should its features and boundaries not be 
studied like any other social construction, ie empirically ? See  D  Priel ,  ‘ Law as a Social Construction 
and Conceptual Legal Theory ’ ( 2019 )  38  Law and Philosophy  267 . 
  85  For one example, consider the adoption, incorporation, and adaptation of Hans Kelsen ’ s ideas 
in court decisions discussing the legal implications of a revolution. For a survey and discussion of 
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be a mistaken application of his own views (see ibid 110 – 13), but it is still the case that  ‘ theoretical ’ 
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not always. cf  J  Dupr é ,  ‘ Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa ’ ( 1981 )  90  Philosophical Review  66 . 
 Let me begin with the fi rst suggestion. This response is likely to be the more 
popular one among legal philosophers, refl ecting the assumption that a  ‘ theory ’ 
of authority (just like a theory of law) should explain all law in one way. This 
answer strikes me as misguided. In somewhat different formulations I have dealt 
with it elsewhere, so I will keep my remarks here brief. This view rests on the 
unstated assumption in much jurisprudential writing that there is one success-
ful account of law ’ s authority. This view also effectively ignores the idea that 
law is a social construction that humans are free to design as they will. This 
view assumes that the category  law (unlike its content) is not a matter of social 
construction (and as such something whose boundaries are to be learned by 
empirical inquiry) but a philosophical question to be determined by conceptual 
analysis. 84 
 This argument thus depends on a distinction between attitudes  about the 
practice, and attitudes  within the practice. The latter are the attitudes of those 
who participate in the practice, while the former are those of the theorists who 
investigate the practice. In reality, the boundaries between the two types are 
often blurred. As practices mature they tend to generate self-referential atti-
tudes, and those often infl uence the practice itself in terms of what it takes to 
engage in the practice successfully, what makes it worthwhile, what makes it 
legitimate. Someone who  ‘ erroneously ’ believes that unjust law is not law (or, 
if it is any different, that unjust law lacks authority) may practise law differ-
ently from someone who rejects this view. Her attitudes about the practice will 
not be easily separated from how she acts within the practice. If certain views 
about the  ‘ philosophical ’ question become dominant, they will change the prac-
tice itself. Interestingly, such an infl uence of attitudes about the practice on the 
practice itself will sometimes happen even when a scholar seeks to provide an 
 ‘ external ’ , conceptual account of the practice, one meant to leave the practice 
as it is. For if a scholar ’ s work is read and infl uences practitioners, it may affect 
their understanding of their own practice. 85 Unlike fi re, earthquakes or diseases, 
where we can plausibly say that people in the past were mistaken about them, 
in the case of law, what people thought about the practice is relevant for under-
standing the practice itself. 86 
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 ‘ Jurisprudence and Necessity ’ ( 2007 )  20  Canadian Journal of  Law and Jurisprudence  173, 188 – 89 ; 
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  88  Kronman (n 7) 1032. 
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  92  Postema,  ‘ Integrity ’ (n 91) 854 – 55; Postema (n 77) 220 – 21. This is also the essence of Dworkin ’ s 
view of law and morality. 
 The alternative proposed here treats different conceptions of authority as 
models. It adds to it the idea that even if one can conceive of a purely reason-
based conception of authority, real-world specimens of law will not be able to 
rid themselves of their relation to time,  because humans are time-constrained 
creatures . 87 If this is indeed the case, this may be enough to vindicate Postema ’ s 
idea that all possible  human law is to going to be related to time. 
 But why should we think that humans are creatures that necessarily live in 
time, and  ‘ with ’ time ? Anthony Kronman presented a very strong version of 
this view, one that he thought posed  ‘ a challenge to the philosophy of law ’ . 
The challenge was to explain the fact that  ‘ [r]espect for past decisions  … 
is a feature of law in general ’ , something he said  ‘ has no place in philosophy is 
indeed antithetical to its governing spirit ’ . 88 The past had this essential role for 
the law, because in law (but not in philosophy)  ‘ the past is  … a repository  … of 
value, with the power to confer legitimacy on actions in the present ’ . 89 While 
Postema shares with Kronman the central role he gave to the past in under-
standing law, and even more the notion of time as the basis for a normative 
theory for law, he did not accept these rather extravagant claims. 90 The past is 
not binding upon us for its own sake. Contrary to Kronman ’ s claims that seem 
to assume that morality is in the domain of timeless ideas, Postema ’ s view is 
that our entire practical lives (even beyond the law) are deeply embedded in 
time. Our practical commitments are  ‘ communal ’ or  ‘ interpersonal ’ to their 
core. 91 And since political communities exist over generations, they have a 
historical dimension. In Postema ’ s view, the basis for law ’ s time-boundedness 
is that morality, and specifi cally justice, is time constrained. Law ’ s embedded-
ness with time is because it plays a role in the communal discourse that is 
constitutive of morality. 92 
 I am sympathetic to this picture, but wish to explain it in a somewhat differ-
ent way. Where Postema focuses on features of practical reason, I prefer to look 
to human nature. That makes my approach more overtly naturalistic. It takes 
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both morality and law to be human practices, and as such to be human shaped: 
they are built on foundations of human nature (humans ’ natural needs, pref-
erences and dispositions), and have been further reshaped by human thought, 
discourse and action throughout history, as well as the circumstances (social, 
political, technological) in which they fi nd themselves. 93 To the extent that 
Postema is correct about the nature of practical reason, it is so, I argue, because 
of what humans and their living conditions are like. Humans are creatures 
whose practical lives exist in time, and so are their morality and laws. Thus, even 
if one can conceive of a purely reason-based (legal) authority, humans may not 
be able to sustain such a legal system in practice. If there is any necessity here, 
it is a natural necessity drawn from facts about human nature, not any kind of 
conceptual necessity. 
 Perhaps the most basic element of humanity that gives time its normative 
signifi cance is memory. That memory is crucial for humanity has been the 
subject of works of art, as well as of psychological case studies of people who 
lost their memory. Most obviously, without memory, humans lose their ability to 
form life plans and sustain meaningful relationships; without memory, learning 
becomes impossible. There is also the fact that humans feel a connection to their 
ancestors, and see themselves as part of an unbroken historical group (family, 
clan, tribe, nation) that began before them and will persist after them. 
 Memory is also signifi cant for some of the most rudimentary aspects of 
normative thought. To the extent that a legal action is a reaction to a person ’ s 
past behaviour, it requires memory. Thus, the idea of holding people to 
account is not possible without memory. Longer-term memory is necessary 
for one of the most undemanding notion of fairness  – treating present actions 
in the same way we treated similar actions in the past. It is true that human 
normative thought does not always take this form. In theory, one could always 
pass judgment  ‘ on the merits ’ of every case, without regard to past judgments 
on similar actions. Such a possibility might even suggest that relying on past 
decisions makes no sense: if  we decided wrongly in the past, there is little 
point in repeating the error; and if  we decided correctly, then doing the same 
now can be justifi ed by appeal to the reasons behind that decision, not to the 
earlier decision itself. But in reality constraints of time, fairness considera-
tions, and even doubts about the possibility of fi nding the  ‘ correct ’ answer may 
warrant sticking with an earlier decision. These considerations are powerful 
enough that even in legal systems that do not recognise precedent as a source 
of law, courts tend to follow past decisions. They also explain why attempts 
in some legal systems to prohibit the use of precedent have all eventually been 
abandoned. 
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  95  For some examples, see Priel (n 81) 645 – 52. 
 In addition to the psychological pull of norms of fairness ( ‘ treating like 
cases alike ’ ), the past also has a  ‘ sociological ’ impact on the law, as past norma-
tive choices may be constrained by present institutional possibilities. A legal 
system, unlike a book on moral philosophy, has institutional mechanisms that 
change in response to past decisions. Enforcement mechanisms, institutional-
ised knowledge-dissemination devices (courses, books), contracts and other 
legal documents  – all are shaped on the basis of past normative choices, and 
help enshrine them. They often make maintaining past decisions simpler and 
cheaper, rather than changing course. 94 
 The time-based conception of authority may be thought to derive from these 
facts and give them normative primacy. Time-based authority in its idealised 
form does not assume that there is a moral truth out there that law aims to 
match. Rather, it treats its own past as  constructive of the relevant legal truth. 
This is relevant in an underappreciated way to familiar jurisprudence debates: 
since past decisions change the environment in which present decisions are 
made, it follows that what constitutes  ‘ the right answer purely on the merits of 
the case ’ may be different depending on existing institutional context, which 
(as explained) is dependent on the past. 
 The effect of this may be signifi cant: the views described in the previous 
paragraph are close to those held by Dworkin, and as such are relevant to famil-
iar questions about the relationship between law and morality. They are also 
relevant when trying to make sense of the way different legal systems differ 
from each other, and why they have a certain shape and not another. If I am 
right in my overall view about authority, we can explain some of the substantive 
differences among legal systems as derived from their historical ties to different 
conceptions of authority. 95 
 All this is signifi cant for the question of the inevitability of some time-based 
element in an account of law ’ s authority, because it shows how the past may have 
normative impact even when decision makers do not make any conscious effort 
to align present decisions with past ones. Can time nevertheless be avoided in the 
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law, despite all this ? In certain domains humans have developed practices that are 
relatively impervious to time-bound thinking. Perhaps the most notable example 
is scientifi c practice. Even where the science in question has a time element built 
into it (as is the case with evolutionary theory), scientifi c ethos tends to give little 
authority to the  discipline ’ s own past. Admittedly, even here the picture is more 
complex (scientists are human too), but there is no denying that precedent and 
tradition have no authority in science in the way they do in the law. 
 Against this background, we may understand those who argue for law in 
terms of reason-based ( ‘ natural law ’ ) or will-based ( ‘ positivist ’ ) conceptions of 
authority do not present  ‘ descriptive ’ or  ‘ conceptual ’ claims about the nature of 
law. Rather, their efforts should be understood as idealisations of law based on 
the model of science, and an attempt to create law whose authority is similarly 
independent of appeal to the past. 
 The popularity of the progressive-science model of jurisprudence shows that 
this ethos has proven attractive in the philosophy of law, so much so that its 
proponents have put it forward not just at the level of jurisprudential method, 
but as a foundation for a substantive theory of law as well. But despite centuries 
of effort, attempts to model human law on science have not proven successful. 
Perhaps with the advent of legal automation such ideas might fi nally be more 
successful. Until this (maybe) happens, it remains an interesting historical and 
theoretical question why science and law have proven so different on this score. 
(Here, as elsewhere, law is more like engineering than science, and engineering 
has a more profound relationship with time.) Until then, a theory of law that 
aims at descriptive accuracy has to acknowledge the normative role time plays 
in the law. In saying all this, I have ended up accepting something like Postema ’ s 
claim about the inevitable connection between law ’ s authority and time. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
 In most jurisprudential thinking time does not play a signifi cant role. This is 
most evident in the characterisation of the domain as concerned with necessary 
and, as such, timeless truths. This view, as I suggested at the outset, seems to be 
based on the assumption that if there are no such timeless truths then there is no 
room for a philosophy of law, only sociology (broadly conceived): contingent, 
local, empirical. 96 As I have tried to show, much of contemporary jurisprudence 
is time-less in other senses as well: uninterested in the history of law, the history 
of jurisprudence, or the role of time in law. The primary aim of this chapter has 
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been to bring time back in in three different ways. The fi rst and least controver-
sial sense is that jurisprudence, like any learned activity, has a history. This will 
not be denied by anyone, but it will be deemed insignifi cant to the subject matter 
itself as a kind of progressive science with accumulated knowledge. Against this 
view, I have argued that it is diffi cult to draw a clear line between legal practice 
and legal theory, because the latter typically emerges from a more-or-less self-
conscious attempt by practitioners to understand their practice. And thus, to 
the extent that law is tied to time in a more signifi cant sense, so is jurisprudence. 
 At a second level, jurisprudence is tied to time because law, or at least the 
kind of law called  ‘ common law ’ , is steeped in time in the sense that the very 
justifi cation for saying that something is the law now is because it was judged to 
be the law in the past. The practice of appealing to precedent is one that uses the 
law ’ s own past as a form of justifi cation. But though familiar to lawyers, to say 
 ‘ this is what we should do now,  because we did something similar in the past ’ 
is not an obvious statement. Despite the centrality of this kind of reasoning in 
the common law, it is a feature of law that many jurisprudential theories have 
neglected. 
 Finally, at the most philosophical level, there is the fact that jurisprudence 
is a study of a human practice. Here, I drew on history, both by turning to the 
philosophy of history and by examining the way that human institutions exist 
in time. I took Postema ’ s invitation to think of jurisprudence as practical reason 
as an invitation to think of it in terms of the way humans reason. 97 And it is here 
that we should look at the way psychologists have improved our understanding 
of human reasoning. I took ideas that were not developed within a naturalistic 
framework and have attempted to  ‘ naturalise ’ them. 
 It is a testament to the breadth and depth of Postema ’ s body of work that he 
has made signifi cant contributions to all three levels: to the philosophical study 
of past jurisprudential thought, to the articulation of common law theory as a 
distinct theory of law, and to the temporal element in law as an inescapable part 
of a study of the role of law in practical reasoning. 
 
  97  cf  D  Priel ,  ‘ Action, Politics, and the Normativity of Law ’ ( 2017 )  8  Jurisprudence  118, 121 – 22 . 
